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11 Introduction
2The nature of knowledge work is changing and workers spend less and less time on their dedi-
cated workstations at the office. Some companies do not even have the traditional office facili-
ties anymore, and the “office” is divided in private homes around four continents (Breaugh et 
al., 2012). 
During the last decade the internet connection speeds have increased and the cost of computa-
tional speed has decreased. This has allowed a set of new alternatives to gain popularity among 
the mobile workers and their employees. These centralized remote working solutions are usu-
ally categorized under the term Cloud Computing or Business Cloud (Pallis, 2010). As Pallis 
(2010) describes, cloud computing itself is a wide, multidisciplinary field that is considered to 
be a convergence of several independent computing trends, such as Internet delivery, “pay-as-
you go” utility computing, elasticity, virtualization, grid computing, distributed computing, 
storage, content outsourcing, security, and Web 2.0.
There are an extensive amount of different kinds of cloud computing offerings already on the 
market, and the field is growing fast. At the moment there is one constant definition of cloud 
computing. According to the common definition (NIST, 2011), the shared denominator of 
all the cloud services is that the data is located at remote servers and users can access it from 
almost anywhere over the internet with any suitable device. 
One of the latest Cloud Computing offering to gain popularity in the business world is the 
Desktop Cloud, also known as Desktop-as-a-Service (DaaS). The Desktop Cloud solutions 
create a virtual desktop, which contains all the necessary desktop programs and access to the 
corporate data. The workers can then access their new personal desktop remotely with any 
computer they have at hand. (Beaty et al., 2009)
There is a huge potential for more efficient use of resources and a need for fast scaling as the 
business realities change. Desktop Cloud solutions can help companies to create savings on the 
heavy local desktop and server infrastructure. They can also provide the end users a lot more 
work satisfaction by allowing them to follow their preferences on the endpoint devices with 
strategies like “bring your own device” (BYOD) (Burt, 2011). The cloud services also make it 
easier to hire temporary workers and find suitable workers anywhere, as the virtual desktops 
can be re-provisioned to users without any physical delays and accessed over the public inter-
net from all around the world in minutes after the creation.
However, these ubiquitous access alternatives have also a negative side in the form of security 
risks. When the ICT infrastructure of the company is opened for employees to have the neces-
sary access to use the cloud services, the same openings can be used for malicious purposes. 
Some of the companies are completely avoiding the cloud services because of these security 
risks. But as the cloud evolves and offers increasingly appealing alternative to the “traditional” 
offline computing. Even the late adopters are starting to look into the Cloud and to the differ-
ent security system alternatives to minimize the risks. (Market-Visio, 2013)
31.1 Scope
There are various alternative methods to improve the security in the cloud services, starting 
from the outermost layer, located right next to the public network and continuing deep inside 
the services. For this thesis the scope will be limited to the first line of defense that all the ser-
vices have in common – access control and user authentication. This thesis will take a deeper 
look in to various authentication techniques and how they should be implemented in the busi-
ness cloud computing environment. 
This thesis will take a closer look at one of the fastest growing areas of the business cloud offer-
ing, Desktop-as-a-Service –solutions (DaaS), and especially the authentication methods used. 
As almost all of the affiliated companies are using DaaS solutions for critical software and data 
access alternatives, the business DaaS solutions are one of the most security-critical areas of 
the overall cloud services. The Desktop side of the business cloud is also the most interesting 
focus for Integrated Technology Services (ITS) department at IBM Finland, which is sponsor-
ing this thesis. 
1.2 Objective
This thesis was conducted with IBM Finland to provide insights and new implementation ideas 
for authentication solutions in business cloud environments. The author has been working for 
IBM Finland for two years, designing and implementing DaaS environments and other busi-
ness cloud solutions. The thesis started as a project to support implementing even more usable 
and secure authentication solutions to customer environments. The authentication phase was 
observed to be one of the critical elements for the customers when selecting a service provider, 
thus even small improvements to the current solutions could have a big impact in the tough 
competition. 
The assumption for the research in this thesis is that the levels of usability and security of the 
authentication methods have a negative correlation (Whitten et al., 1999). In the most extreme 
cases the system is 100% secure, and as a result even the intended users are unable to access it. 
On the opposite extreme all the users, even the unintended ones, can access the cloud services 
without any hindrances from the security systems, making the system totally unsecure. All of 
the examples in the real world are assumed to rest somewhere between these two extremes. 
This thesis aims to define an implementable authentication strategy that meets or exceeds the 
usability expectations of typical business users. At the same time the authentication strategy 
should meet the complex security demand of the business context. This aim is approached 
with three research questions:
4Rq1 Identify a) the common authentication methods used in business cloud authentication 
at the moment and b) emerging new authentication methods suitable for the purpose.
Rq2 What are the most important factors, in addition to the authentication method itself, 
that are affecting the security – usability –balance of the whole authentication process and how 
they can be optimized for the business cloud authentication? 
Rq3 How the usability and security aspects of authentication methods affect the user pref-
erence in method selection?
These research questions are answered with a combination of a literature review and an em-
pirical study.
1.3 Structure of the thesis
This thesis will include a literature review and an empirical study. Chapter two presents the 
background info of the key concepts used in this thesis: cloud computing, usability and secu-
rity. 
Chapter three will extend these key concepts and their relations to each other. The chapter 
will also cover some of the recent cloud security related events that have had an impact to the 
industry development. 
Chapter four will introduce the three traditional categories of authentication methods and 
their more recent extensions. Several examples of authentication methods from each category 
have also been selected for a closer introduction. The introduced methods were selected based 
on their estimated relevance on the business cloud authentication context.
Chapter five will present the construction of the empirical study and the theoretical and tech-
nical backgrounds for it. The results of the study will then be presented and analyzed in chap-
ter six.
Chapter seven presents the condensed answers for the research questions and recommenda-
tions for cloud service authentication planning. Chapter seven will also conclude the thesis 
and present ideas for the future research. 
 
52 Background
6This chapter will present the essential background info for this thesis. The definition of cloud 
services will be discussed from the perspective of service- and deployment models, and we’ll 
take a closer look into service model known as Desktop as a Service, which will be the case 
example in this thesis. The chapter will also present the detailed definitions of overall Usability 
and Security. 
 
2.1 The Cloud
2.1.1 Service models
The terms “Cloud” or “Cloud Computing” entered the public discussion around year 2000, 
and The terms “Cloud” or “Cloud Computing” entered the public discussion around year 
2000, and were at first considered yet another buzzword dictionary for old solutions (Pallis, 
2010).. After over a decade of ever increasing popularity of cloud computing (Market-Visio, 
2013), the debate around the exact definition of “The Cloud” is still going on. Many reputable 
authors have given their attempts in defining the concept (Armbrust et al., 2010; Buyya et al, 
2009), but nobody has managed to do it undisputedly. When for example the National Insti-
tute of Standards and Technology (NIST) published their definition of Cloud Computing in 
September 2011 (Mell et al., 2011), it got a lot of criticism (McKendrick, 2012; Yung, 2011) for 
excluding certain borderline concepts.
National Institute of Standards and Technology  (NIST, 2011) defines the Cloud Computing 
to be “a model for enabling ubiquitous, convenient, on-demand network access to a shared 
pool of configurable computing resources (e.g., networks, servers, storage, applications, and 
services) that can be rapidly provisioned and released with minimal management effort or 
service provider interaction.”
NIST definition also describes the Cloud to be composed of three distinctive service models, 
Software as a Service (SaaS), Platform as a Service (PaaS) and Infrastructure as a service (IaaS), 
as found below in Figure 1. 
7Software as a Service
Infrastructure as a Service
Platform as a Service
Figure 1: The cloud service models
In SaaS service model, the Cloud provides end users the ability to use applications running on 
a cloud infrastructure via various devices, such as laptops, tablets or even mobile phones. Most 
of the consumer cloud products like webmail and file storage services are SaaS offerings, and 
the business model is popular among the business users as well (Marston et al., 2011).
In PaaS offerings the customer is provided with a customizable platform that supports prede-
fined types of applications, libraries, tools and programming languages. In other words, this 
means that each platform provider has built their platform offerings with distinctive set of ap-
plications and supported languages, which might make switching providers a really challeng-
ing and expensive task. The customer has full control over the supported solutions, but not for 
the underlying cloud infrastructure or the amount of supported applications. 
IaaS service model is the most flexible of the three in terms of customizability. The customer 
gets full control over the provisioned resources from the provider’s cloud infrastructure and is 
free to deploy any operating systems or stand-alone applications on them. 
8In addition to these three most common service models, there is almost unlimited amount of 
other XaaS (Everything as a Service) offerings, which include services like AaaS (Architecture 
as a Service), BaaS (Business as a Service), CaaS (Computing as a Service), and so on. As there 
are no rules or regulations on XaaS acronyms, it is certain that the Cloud industry will supply 
a steady stream of new aaS’es as the offerings expand to new service models (IBM, 2008). These 
acronyms are in no way standardized or controlled, which means that there exists a lot of over-
lapping and inconsistencies in terminology. For example one vendors’ VaaS can be called SaaS 
by another vendor. 
To sum it up, the terms “Cloud” and “Cloud Computing” are as elastic and flexible as the ser-
vices they describe. Due to this elasticity and varying interests of the different actors in the 
Cloud business, it is likely that a solid definition will never be reached. At least not before “The 
Cloud” itself gets replaced by the next step in the evolution of the global ICT environment.
2.1.2 Deployment models
There are four different deployment models for the cloud services: private, community, public 
and hybrid. They differ from each other by cost, security level and potential user base. (NIST, 
2011)
Private cloud
The cloud infrastructure is built for a single organization and can include any number of end 
users that belong to that specific organization. Private clouds can be owned, managed and op-
erated by the organization itself, a third party, or some combination of them. 
A private cloud infrastructure is the most secure deployment model for the cloud as no outsid-
ers have legitimate access to the infrastructure, and the organization has full control over the 
permissions and the authentication process.
On the flipside, private clouds lose a part of the flexibility present in other deployment models, 
as the resources can be scaled and distributed only inside of a single organization. Depending 
on the deployed cloud service, the effect of privatization to the cloud cost structure might vary 
from minimal to very high, compared to shared resources. 
In some situations a private cloud might be only possible deployment model due to external 
reasons e.g. software licenses or security requirements. 
9Community cloud
The user base of community cloud can consist of end users in several different organizations 
that belong to the same “community”, e.g. share some interests or requirements relevant to the 
cloud infrastructure. Community cloud can be managed by any of the companies belonging to 
the “community” or a third-party service provider. 
Community cloud can be regarded as an “extended private cloud”, in which the member com-
panies can control the membership of the community. Each company can also know who they 
are sharing the infrastructure with, and who are the outsiders having a potential in-cloud ac-
cess to their systems e.g. through unpatched security holes.
With the community cloud model, participating companies can benefit from the economics of 
scale by optimizing the cloud hardware with their partially overlapping usage needs. The com-
munity cloud is still not as flexible as the huge public clouds, but it is certainly more efficient 
than using the same applications in separate private clouds.
Public cloud
The public cloud, as the name implies, is open to anyone. The cloud infrastructure is provided 
by a private service provider or a public organization and anyone can participate as long as 
they meet the pre-defined access requirements, for example paying the monthly fee. 
The entire public cloud infrastructure usually exists in the premises of the cloud provider, and 
they can scale the infrastructure according to the estimated usage and profiling. For example 
if the user base is divided in different time zones, the core infrastructure can manage more 
evenly divided load throughout the day. 
In terms of security, public cloud services can cause some concerns for the companies. They do 
not know who they are sharing the infrastructure with in cases of possible data mix-ups and 
security breaches. And they do not have any way to monitor the cloud provider, who has the 
full administrative rights to all of their operations and data in the public cloud.
Hybrid cloud
Hybrid cloud infrastructure is a composition of two or more different cloud deployment mod-
els. In a hybrid cloud, different deployment models are separate entities that are bound togeth-
er by some technology that enables data and application portability between different clouds. 
Hybrid clouds can be used, for example, for load balancing DaaS services. If the company’s 
private cloud cannot handle the peak traffic during a busy time of the year, it can burst the 
extra virtual desktops to a community cloud which is built for such occasions by a few partner 
companies with different peak seasons. 
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2.1.3 Desktop as a Service - Desktop Cloud
This thesis will focus on a sub-category of PaaS service model, Desktop as a Service - DaaS. In 
DaaS, the cloud platform offering is extended to cover all the aspects of everyday computing of 
the end users. The DaaS offerings usually cover all the interaction interfaces between the end 
users and the rest of the company infrastructure, all of the things that the traditional company-
provided laptop would include. The actual setup of DaaS environments varies a lot depending 
on the needs of the company, but DaaS offering usually includes access to a pre-defined set of 
programs and data storages and limited or unlimited access to corporate network resources. 
Currently all the biggest business DaaS offerings are built with Microsoft Windows. Two of the 
main reasons for this operating system selection are compatibility with the existing business 
software and offering the end users a familiar interface to the system. (Beaty et al., 2009)
There are several reasons why companies are implementing or planning to implement DaaS 
solutions in their environment, but usually the three main factors are control, price and con-
nectivity in varying order of importance. It is possible to use DaaS to achieve a lower TCO (a 
total cost of ownership) or more efficient end-user solutions than with traditional infrastruc-
ture based solely on a local hardware computing. In some cases it might even be possible to 
achieve both of these goals simultaneously. 
The DaaS solutions also create new possibilities to manage the whole business infrastructure. 
For example a concept called Bring Your Own Device (BYOD) empowers the end users to 
select their own tools and still be compliant with the company IT processes and requirements 
(Burt, 2011).  
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2.2 Usability
This section presents the viewpoint to usability from two different perspectives that are ap-
proaching the definition from different directions and thus complementing each other. Jacob 
Nielsen approaches the definition (Nielsen, 1993) with a lot of practical experience from con-
ducted usability testing. Other viewpoint comes from the academic research of the Interna-
tional Organization for Standardization, as the ISO 9241-11 (ISO, 1998) defines context of use 
and measurements for evaluating usability in set contexts. 
2.2.1 Usability according to Nielsen
According to the definition of Jacob Nielsen (Nielsen, 1993), usability is a sub-concept of use-
fulness, together with utility. Utility means that the system can perform all the tasks that it 
needs to perform and usability is used to define how easy it is for the users to actually perform 
these actions. Usability is further composed of five factors: learnability, efficiency, memorabil-
ity, amount of errors and satisfaction.
Usefulness itself is a further sub-category in Nielsen’s general definition (Figure 3). The main 
definition of system-level acceptability is divided in social and practical acceptability. Social 
acceptability is more about feeling and opinions than technical solutions; how the people in 
general see the system and do they accept its functions like gathering or publishing data. The 
practical acceptability in turn consists of the practical measurements of acceptability like cost, 
reliability and compatibility. Usefulness is in turn a sub-category of practical acceptability.
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Figure 2. Breakdown of system acceptability (Nielsen, 1993). 
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Learnability
Learnability can be evaluated by measuring how easy is it for users to accomplish basic tasks 
the first time they encounter the design. Systems that are aimed for professional users can have 
a longer learning curve if the intention is to eventually achieve a higher skill level. However, 
systems intended for novice users or only for occasional use need to be faster to learn to meet 
the usability requirements.
Efficiency
Efficiency of a system is the level of performance the user can achieve through practice. The 
efficiency can be measured by measuring the completion time of a task over several recursions. 
When the additional practice does not affect the performance anymore, the user has reached 
his maximum efficiency with the system. These measurements can then be used to benchmark 
the efficiency level of other users.
Memorability
Memorability is about the proficiency of users with a system design, when they use it after a 
period of inactivity. When users return to the design, how easily can they re-establish profi-
ciency? This can be best measured with a performance testing, as the users can remember the 
usage practices of a system without remembering specific menu terms or icons. 
Errors
There are several levels of errors that the user can encounter in a system. Some of the lower lev-
els of errors do not necessarily require any actions, especially if recovering from them is trivial 
for the user. On the other hand, especially catastrophic errors that have serious consequences 
to the ongoing tasks should be analyzed in great detail.   
Satisfaction
The subjective satisfaction of use is extremely important and can be in a major role when the 
user decides about the future use of the system. The satisfaction should be asked only after the 
actual use of the system, as the correlation between answers before and after the actual use 
tend to be low (Root et al., 1983).
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2.2.2 Usability according to ISO 9241-11
The International Organization for Standardization defines usability in ISO 9241-11 as “the 
extent to which a product can be used by specified users to achieve specified goals with effec-
tiveness, efficiency and satisfaction in a specified context of use” (ISO, 1998). 
This means that the standard measures usability with achieving the goals from three axes: Ef-
fectiveness, Efficiency and Satisfaction.
Figure 3. Usability framework (ISO, 1998).
Equipment
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15
Effectiveness 
Effectiveness measures how well do the users achieve their goals using the system, e.g. what 
percentage of a task can be completed within set boundaries.
Efficiency
Efficiency is the relationship of used resources (e.g. time) to the achieved effectiveness. 
Satisfaction
Satisfaction measures how the users feel about their use of the system and what is their rate of 
voluntary use.
User
Users should be described by clearly defining all their important characteristics (related to the 
system). The definition should be done on a level of individual users, as the characteristics-
level definition does not take into account the different combinations of characteristics inside 
individual user types. 
Task
Tasks are the actions that users need to do in order to reach the goal. The tasks should be al-
ways analyzed in the context of the targeted goals. The performed tasks are usually identified 
by using a task analysis methodology.
Equipment
All the context-related equipment and their properties should be described in detail. As the 
user interacts with the system through the related equipment, they might have a big impact on 
the system usability. 
Environment
All the relevant attributes of the physical and social environment need to be described.  These 
might include attributes of the wider technical environment (e.g. the local area network), the 
physical environment (e.g. workplace, furniture), the ambient environment (e.g. temperature, 
humidity) and the social and cultural environment (e.g. work practices, organizational struc-
ture and attitudes).
Goals
The goals and the criteria that satisfy them should be described in detail. The goals can also be 
described in form of all the sub-goals that are needed to reach to the actual goals. The success 
criterion of the sub-goals has to be also analyzed. 
(ISO, 1998; Wixon et al., 1997) 
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Some weaknesses to ISO9241-11 are that it does not tackle the viewpoint of learnability, which 
most of the usability experts consider as an essential part of usability (Abran et al., 2003; Niels-
en 1993). The ISO standard also does not make any connection to the security questions relat-
ing to usability, even though including this connection to the definition of usability has a lot of 
support from the domain experts (Abran et al., 2003).  
2.3 Security
The International Organization for Standardization defines security in the context of Informa-
tion Security in their standard ISO 27002 (ISO, 2005) to consist of 12 different areas:
Risk Assessment - determining asset vulnerability;
Security Policy - management direction;
Organization of Information Security  - governance of information security;
Asset Management - inventory and classification of information assets;
Human Resources Security - security aspects for employees joining,  moving and leaving 
an organization;
Physical and Environmental Security - protection of the computer facilities;
Communications and Operations Management - management of technical security 
controls;
Access Control - restriction of access rights to networks, systems, applications, functions 
and data;
Information systems acquisition, development and maintenance - building se-
curity into applications;
Information security Incident Management - anticipating and responding appropri-
ately to security breaches;
Business Continuity Management - protecting, maintaining and recovering business-
critical processes and systems;
Compliance - ensuring conformance with information security policies, standards, laws and 
regulations
Of these 12 different areas, Access Control is the most relevant one for the scope of this thesis. 
Access control starts with identification, where the user makes a claim of his identity. The truth 
value of this claim has to be asserted before the user can be granted access to the controlled 
system.
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The truth value of identification is determined in the process of authentication, where the user 
provides the service a trusted piece of information to verify his identity, and the service knows 
that only a legitimate user should have access to that information. Authentication process is 
presented with more detail in chapter 4.
Next step after authentication is to determine what of the areas user can access in the system 
and what kind of actions he can perform; the user has to be authorized. Authorization can be 
controlled by centralized administration (non-discretionary approach) or the owner of the 
information resource (discretionary approach). (Renaud, 2005)
Access control security of any given system can be divided to internal security and external se-
curity. Internal security is related to the system properties and functions and how well they are 
aligned with the rest of the system. External security considers the environment around the se-
curity system and actors related to it. Both aspects of security are important when considering 
an overall secure system, as they can either support or undermine each other. (Renaud, 2005)
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2.3.1 Internal security
Figure 4. Security dimensions (Renaud, 2005). 
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As seen in Figure 4, internal security can be divided to six different dimensions with varying 
security deficit. In practice these dimensions are highly interdependent and changing one di-
mension will certainly affect several others. But all of them still have different characteristics 
that have to be considered separately. (Renaud, 2005)
Predictability
Predictability is a big issue in security, especially in authentication, as people tend to select 
weak passwords that are easy to predict (discussed further in section 3.2). Passwords selected 
by the user or generated by the computer have the highest potential predictability. Biometrics 
and system-generated recognition are the most unpredictable methods, but if the user can 
select the recognition pattern himself, it becomes as predictable as user-generated passwords. 
Cultural recognition, based for example to childhood memories, is at the middle of the scale; 
the information is generally known by only a few people, but it might be possible to uncover it 
with research-based attack.  
Abundance
Abundance means the amount of alternatives that user has when selecting his authenticating 
information. For example if the choice is limited to the recognized words of English language, 
the user has only 1 000 000 alternatives. On the other end of spectrum are graphical and cul-
tural passwords, which have a theoretically unlimited amount of alternatives when used cor-
rectly.
Biometrics is very limited in abundance, as we have only two retinas, ten fingertips and so on. 
If biometrics is used in a controlled environment, abundance is not an issue. But in uncon-
trolled environment the lack of abundance and inability to replace compromised authentica-
tion may have serious consequences. 
Disclosure
The password or any other forms of authentication should not be disclosed to anyone; other-
wise the reliability of authentication fails. If the user can easily record his authentication and it 
can be given to, observed or stolen by somebody else, the system is clearly deficient. The least 
deficient options are recall-based authentication scenarios and tokens that are based on non-
disclosed shared secrets. However, the recall process can be observed and repeated, and the 
token can be given away or stolen, which can also be counted as a disclosure.
Breakability and crackability
This dimension is defined by the amount of time, effort and money that the attacker has to 
spend to complete his attack and gain access to the system. Research-based attack to actually 
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know the user and his history is the most costly form of attack. Passwords that can be attacked 
with brute force and dictionary attacks are less secure. The worst points go to systems that are 
open to external observation like keyloggers and similar malware, which are really easy and 
efficient methods for attackers. 
Privacy
The system might want to record personal details to support the authentication or key recov-
ery (e.g. in case of forgotten password). These details might either potentially compromise 
the security of other services if they are connecting to same information, or compromise user 
privacy by forcing him to share personal information. Biometrics has a maximum deficit, as 
it reveals very personal details to the system. In addition especially fingerprints are strongly 
associated with law enforcement and thus (mis)using them constitutes as an inherent privacy 
violation. At the moment most users do not have similar associations with other biometric sys-
tem, but situation might change if for example retinal scanners would become more popular 
in the official context.  
Confidentiality
Authentication process is based on the confirmation, which the user is in possession of a pre-
agreed key. The confidentiality-dimension is defined by how vulnerable that key is during the 
authentication process; if it has to be fully revealed, like in the case of alphanumeric password, 
the system has the least amount of confidentiality. Methods that reveal only parts of the key 
(like cultural recognition) or methods that use random responses signed with a shared key, 
thus keeping the key itself completely hidden (like SecurID token) are considered to be more 
confidential.  
2.3.2 External security
In addition to the internal security dimensions, every truly secure system has to be aligned 
with its environment. Aligning the system security with the environment requires taking into 
consideration a wide array of factors of accessibility, memorability, cost and external security. 
It is practically impossible to list the important individual factors as they vary in each environ-
ment, but some of the most important security factors are fairly universal: (Renaud, 2005) 
Trust
If the user trusts the person or organization that is requesting authentication, the internal se-
curity dimensions privacy and confidentiality become less important. The connection works 
the other way around as well, if the user does not know or does not trust the service provider, 
internal privacy and confidentiality become more important.
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Security motivation
This reflects how strongly the organization can motivate individual users to act according to 
the existing security practices. If the users have enough security motivation, the internal di-
mension of disclosure is still important but not as vital as with low user security motivation. 
Auditing
If system auditing is done in real time, it can trigger secondary security mechanisms when the 
system is compromised and thus minimize the damage. If there is no auditing, the internal 
dimensions of breakability and crackability become vital. 
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3 Balancing Usability and Security
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Balancing usability and security has been a researched topic long before the term “cloud com-
puting” was even conceived (Saltzer et al., 1975; Reid, 1991; Bishop, 2005). As securing any 
system essentially means limiting access to its information in one way or another, the issues 
of balancing usability, the ability for wanted users to access the information conveniently, and 
security, making accessing the information as difficult as possible for the unwanted users, has 
been a challenge during the whole intelligent history of the human race. 
This chapter will introduce the theoretical background for balancing security and usability re-
lated to ICT systems. In addition to the actual authentication methods, which will be discussed 
in more details in chapter four, this chapter will also present the most important external fac-
tors affecting the authentication process.
3.1 Passwords
For the scope of this thesis, the relevant starting point for analyzing the history of usability and 
security is the history of offline and online computer systems and their authentication. The 
most common and thus most researched authentication method in the era of personal com-
puters has been the combination of a unique user ID and a password. The method consists of 
two stages: a public identification (user ID) to identify the user and a secret password to verify 
the ownership of the ID. Many of the phenomena observed with passwords are applicable with 
other similar authentication methods as well. (Adams et al., 1999).  
In their article ‘Users are not the enemy’, Adams and Sasse argue that the human factor should 
be included in the design of the security mechanisms (Adams et al., 1999). They point to pre-
vious research (DeAlvare, 1988; DeAlvare et al. ,1988) to show, that the users have a tendency 
of trying to avoid or go around the high security standards meant to assure password security 
(FIPS, 1985) when the users do not see the balance between security gains and usability hin-
drances. This kind of behavior might lead the security departments to classify all the users as 
inherently insecure or, even worse, as the enemy to be managed with even stricter limitations 
and by demanding for longer passwords (Adams et al., 1999).
Creating new, tighter technical rules that are against the users’ existing workflow has the com-
plete opposite effect than intended (Renaud, 2012). Several authors point out, that when pass-
word requirements get too complicated, when the passwords have to be changed frequently, 
or the user has to use too many different passwords overall, the users will react against these 
changes. The cognitive overload will drive the users to-wards different coping methods (Table 
1). These coping methods will erode the overall security, keeping up just the appearance of 
security towards the administrators. And it is not just the users; even the administrators and 
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Table 1, The popularity of different password coping techniques. (Renaud, 2012). 
experts start breaking their own rules when they think that the rules are on their way. For 
example, in his article When Securi-ty Gets in the Way, Norman (2009) tells a rule-breaking 
story to give a glimpse inside the minds of a roomful of the world’s top security experts: they 
used stones to prop open several high-level security doors next to the auditorium to make 
toilet breaks easier during a security conference. (Renaud, 2012; Adams et al. 1999; Norman, 
2009)
5%
14%
48%
8%
25%
Write passwords down
Reuse passwords
Use the system name
Use own username
Use month and year
25
3.2 Stealing passwords
Users themselves are not the only attack vectors against passwords. During the recent years, 
several big companies and social networks have lost millions of passwords to various attacks 
and data leaks. One of the biggest and most analyzed leaks was LinkedIn (Kamp, 2012). In 
June 2012 the company announced that 6 458 020 passwords had been stolen from them and 
published in a Russian hacker forum. 
Luckily for LinkedIn and its users, the passwords that were published, were not in clear text 
format, but just a hashes of the passwords. A password hash is calculated with a hash function 
when the user creates his account, and only this one-way hash is saved to the system. The only 
way for outsiders to know what alphanumeric string created the hash is guessing, calculating 
hundreds of millions possible passwords with the original public hash function and compar-
ing them to the stolen hashes. (Kamp, 2012). 
No matter how efficient hashing algorithms or how much salting is used, all hashes can be 
cracked with enough time and computational power. But as people tend to use same passwords 
for multiple accounts, it is important to protect the passwords well enough to give them time 
to prevent the damage from spreading to other services when the password hashes get stolen.
As a positive result, these data leaks help the researchers to define the most common pass-
words and guide people to avoid these easily crackable alternatives. According to research by 
SplashData, the most common passwords in 2012 were “password”, “123456” and “12345678” 
(SplashData, 2012).
Big web services are also starting to understand that just passwords are not strong enough to 
protect the user data. The recent password leaks have hastened many companies like Google, 
Dropbox and several big online gaming companies to provide two-factor authentication for 
their users, and according to their public discussions, many other companies are planning to 
do the same.
 
3.3 Communicating with the user
There are no simple solutions for designing the balance between additional password secu-
rity mechanisms, added difficulty and the insecure coping methods. However, there are some 
methods presented in the literature that will help to move towards a better balance.
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Traditionally one of the cornerstones of information system security has been that the users 
know as little as possible about the system, so they would not be able to break it or tell outsid-
ers about it. Also, most of the non-technical users might have a somewhat distorted view of 
technical security issues like levels of password entropy and dangers of dictionary attacks, and 
these misconceptions drive their actions to insecure practices. (Adams, 1999; Renaud, 2012)
In optimal situations, communicating with the user can solve both of these main issues; the 
security system itself does not necessary have to be changed at all. The first thing communi-
cated to the user should be the basic rules in easily understandable format: how the system 
works and what a compliant and secure password is. The users should be provided assistance 
or feedback while selecting the optimal password. The users should also be provided with 
more secure alternatives than Post-It notes to store their passwords if, and when, the storing 
becomes necessary. (Norman, 2009; Adams et al., 1999)
Users might also need education about the data security to avoid accidental leaks. Ac-cording 
to Adams and Sasse, the observed users easily identified the need for security with data that 
contained sensitive information about individuals, but it was a lot harder for them to correctly 
classify such business-critical information as customer databases or financial data. (Adams et 
al., 1999) 
 
3.4 Punishing the users who break the rules
If and when the security breaches happen, it can sometimes be attributed to a single compli-
ance failure of an individual user. In some cases (Renaud, 2012) the first reaction would be to 
punish the user or even terminate his contract. If the error was deliberate and showed high 
level of security neglect, this might be the right course of action. However, in some cases the 
user was just acting according to the company culture, and the culture itself was distorted in 
the security compliance. In this kind of cases the punishment would serve only as a short-term 
warning to the rest of the organization and the security would soon deteriorate back to the 
normal level. In these company culture-related breaches, it will be more effective to focus on 
company-wide education and instructions to raise the overall security level. 
Worst course of action is to do nothing, or at least nothing visible to the users. This king of 
non-action after security breaches tends to cause “it does not matter anyway” –type of attitude 
towards all of the security rules. The company-wide action also helps to adjust the users’ level 
of perceived threats closer to the real situation.  (Renaud, 2012; Adams et al., 1999)
 
27
3.5 The weakest link?
Most of the security breaches to computer systems are not done to computers; they are done 
to humans (Sasse et. al, 2001). The first of such attack vectors is towards the users themselves 
and their coping methods. The attackers can use the inbuilt flaws of the security setups, like too 
frequent password changes that lead the users to write their passwords to post-its, as a leverage 
to gain access to the system (Sasse et. al, 2001). 
The second possible attack vector is to utilize more sophisticated social engineering tactics to 
con the legitimate users into giving them the access voluntarily. According to a general defi-
nition, social engineering is manipulating natural human tendency to trust others (Granger, 
2001). In one of his examples, Granger (2001) tells a story about a group of social hackers that 
were able to gain a complete access to a big company’s well-protected network with a combina-
tion of social engineering and security flaws; they pretended having lost their keys and security 
cards and friendly employees helped them by letting them into the building. Next they got into 
an executive’s office and used the few basic facts they had studied of him to con the network 
password from the IT support. After that they were able to extend to full access to the system 
with regular hacking software.
Different kinds of password recovery systems are also one of the most common attack vectors 
to any system that utilizes the option. In some cases the answers to the recovery questions like 
“what is your mother’s maiden name” can be found easily through social media or with a few 
Google searches (Bonneau 2010). Some services like highly security-focused email provider 
Hushmail externalized the problem by encrypting the account content and not storing the en-
cryption key themselves. When the user forgets his password, he might be allowed to wipe the 
whole account and start from zero with the same name, but all the stored content like credit 
cards numbers would be automatically wiped and thus unavailable for attackers. This would 
also destroy all the data for the legitimate users, so there still is some potential for misuse or 
unintentional damage. Some online merchants like BestBuy offer a mixed approach to the 
issue by wiping the most valuable data like credit card info, but retaining some info for the 
convenience of the customer. (Bonneau, 2010; BestBuy, 2013)   
Another alternative for a security breach is to use social engineering skills against the cus-
tomer support and have them unknowingly do all the hacking. For example in a social hacking 
exploit used against Amazon.com in late 2012, the attackers were able to bypass the adequately 
password-protected online store features by contacting the customer support with a few data 
points found from social networks; the content of the order from user’s twitter post and basic 
user details from the his social media profiles.  With those details the attackers managed to 
convince the customer support into thinking that the original orders were lost during trans-
port and that the replacements should be sent to their address. (Cardinal, 2012) 
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4 Authentication methods and 
situations
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This chapter takes a look into three different categories of authentication methods and their 
suitability for cloud service authentication. Based on the different properties of authenticating 
factors, authentication has been traditionally divided in three categories: something you have, 
something you know (memometrics), or something you are or can do (biometrics) (Cohen, 
1997; Renaud, 2005). Each of these categories can be used alone to authenticate a user, or then 
they can be used in sequence for two-factor or multiple-factor authentication scenarios for 
added security, but also potentially reduced usability. This chapter will take a closer look into 
these authentication methods and some of the most common technologies from each method. 
The chapter will also present a fourth, emerging category, “somebody you know”, which is de-
signed on top of the social layer and human connections.
The chapter will also examine several alternatives for sharing authentication and single sign-
on, technologies designed to reduce the amount of different login accounts for the users. 
In the context of business cloud and desktop virtualization, there are three most common au-
thentication scenarios that the end users will encounter. These scenarios were used as a start-
ing point to select and evaluate the authentication methods to be introduced in this chapter, 
and further when selecting the methods to be included in the usability study that is introduced 
in chapter 5. 
Scenario 1: Using the virtual desktop through the company network or separately authen-
ticated VPN, with a tightly controlled company-owned PC.
Scenario 2:  Using the virtual desktop through open network at a secure location (e.g. the 
office, home) with a self-purchased PC (or a loosely controlled company-owned PC)
Scenario 3: Using the virtual desktop through an unknown network with an end device 
owned by a third party from anywhere around the world, e.g. from internet cafe during a vaca-
tion.
4.1 Something you know
Knowing-based authentication includes solutions like passwords and similar learnable, re-
peatable and copyable information. As the intensity of brute force attacks is growing on par 
with the computational power of normal PC’s, this traditional cornerstone of authentication is 
starting to lose its value as a single authentication method. As the brute force attacks become 
easier to implement, the required password complexity to deter them increases. The situation 
is already getting near to the point where the required complexity of a password determined 
to be “relatively secure” becomes impossible to remember for an average person. (Coskun et 
al., 2008)
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4.1.1 User ID and password
A combination of a public identification (user ID) and a secret alphanumeric string to authen-
ticate a user has been the most commonly used method in the history of ICT security (Adams 
et al., 1999). As the computational power is getting cheaper, the passwords have to get longer 
and more complex in order to offer adequate protection. And a long password alone is not 
enough if it is used in two or more services; if one service is hacked then the compromised 
password can be used to break into all the other accounts. During the past two years alone, 
280 million encrypted passwords have been published for everyone to see, usually in con-
nection with a large security break to popular Internet services. A comparison between these 
encrypted password leaks showed that 49% of the users had reused their passwords in two or 
more of the hacked sites. (Honan, 2012)  
4.1.2 PwdHash – Service-specific passwords through 
hashing
Figure 5. PwdHash online interface.
As mentioned above, one of the issues with 
the password infrastructure is creating unique, 
service-specific passwords that are complicated 
enough to meet all the security criteria and still 
remembering all of them. One possibility to 
solve this issue is to use a single cleartext pass-
word and using a secure algorithm to combine 
it with the domain name. Stanford Security Lab 
developed one version of this approach, called 
PwdHash (Ross et al., 2005). Using PwdHash 
to combine an example domain 
http://pwdhash.com with a simple and inse-
cure password “password” provides a unique 
and a lot more secure hashed password 
“59UI7D6pjc” as seen in Figure 5. A big part 
of the PwdHash project was to improve the us-
ability of the hashing solution by developing a 
browser extension to do the hashing automati-
cally when the user presses F2-key or precedes 
the password with a string @@. PwdHash adds 
password entropy significantly with a mini-
mal change to the user’s login process and no 
changes to the server configuration. 
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4.2 Something you have
Having-based authentication means that you prove your identity with a physical object you 
have with you. This can be built especially for authentication (like RSA tag or a key) or au-
thentication can be considered as a secondary function of the object (like a mobile phone). 
Confirming the ownership of the authentication object is not part of a having-based authenti-
cation, so anyone who has access to the object can use it to authenticate himself with the exact 
same authorization than the original owner. (Renaud, 2005)
4.2.1 RSA SecurID – hardware token
RSA SecurID hardware token, manufactured by EMC (EMC, 2013), is a physical device that 
contains a lock and a secret key. When the two are combined with a cryptographic function 
that includes the date and time of the creation, the product is a numeric code on a small 
display (Figure 6). The user has to manually type the code to the authenticating application, 
which checks the code validity from RSA servers. The authenticating RSA servers know the 
secret key stored at the user token and the authentication time; based on these the authenticat-
ing server performs the same cryptographic function than the user token. If the values entered 
by the user and calculated by the server match, user is authenticated as the owner of the actual 
token. (Renaud, 2005)
Figure 6. RSA SecurID SID800 token without USB connector (Ochro, 2008).
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4.2.2 Software token
The cryptographic functionality of the software token is 
identical to any hardware token, like RSA SecurID which 
is presented in chapter 4.2.1. The difference is that the 
software token runs on a shared hardware, like a PC or 
a smartphone and is installed like any other software on 
that platform. After the installation, user can either im-
port his own personal secret key, or the software connects 
to the authentication server and generates a new shared 
secret automatically. The key is then stored securely on 
the device without any needs for connecting the authen-
tication server during subsequent authentication pro-
cesses. The software token presents a similar code (Figure 
7) than a hardware token, which has to be typed to the 
authenticating application by the user. (Renaud, 2005; 
NordicEdge 2013).
Figure 7. NordicEdge Pledge, a 
software token.
4.2.3 SMS token
In SMS token system, the authentication factor is the 
MSISDN (ITU, 2010) of the user, which is saved to the 
authentication server and associated with a certain user. 
The SMS authentication is initiated by the user identify-
ing himself or logging in with a first-factor authentica-
tion like alphanumeric password to the authenticating 
service. This prompts the authentication server to send a 
SMS message with a single-use authentication code to the 
MSISDN associated with the user. When the user writes 
the received code during secondary authentication, he is 
assumed to be in possession of the device connected to 
the MSISDN. (NordicEdge, 2013) 
Figure 8. SMS token.
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4.2.4 Email token
The email token is cryptographically identical to the SMS 
token presented in chapter 4.2.3. The difference is that the 
pre-defined delivery route is an email message instead of 
a SMS message. (NordicEdge, 2013)
Figure 9. Email token.
4.3 Something you are
The third authentication category is about being or doing, and it consists of the indistinguish-
able physical or genetic properties of a person. These biometric identification methods are 
usually fast to perform, always available and have a relatively low theoretical False Acceptance 
Rate (FAR, accepting wrong users). However, on the flipside of low FAR, the system might 
have a relatively high False Rejection Rate (FRR, not accepting the real user). High FRR makes 
a system highly unusable and might even cause catastrophic problems if the authorized users 
fail to authenticate themselves in critical situations (Matyas et al., 2003). 
Biometrics is a challenging for cloud access, as it usually require a separate scanner or other 
device to read the analog biometric input into a digital format. In addition, most of the biom-
etric characteristics are relatively easy to forge in an uncontrolled environment; for example 
simple face recognition systems can be fooled with a photograph of the person. 
These issues can be resolved by requiring a controlled environment, but this usually negates 
the mobility benefits of the cloud computing and might be inconvenient for the user. How-
ever, controlled biometrics has a potential of huge amount of easily transportable and highly 
personal authentication information, thus it is already used in high-security environments like 
border control or securing physical access to high-profile facilities. (Coventry, 2005)
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4.3.1 Fingerprints
Using fingerprints as an authentication method is done via a fingerprint scanner, which is 
either built in to the login device or temporary attached as an add-on device. The scanner 
reads the ridge pattern of the finger and converts it to a digital format according to pre-defined 
specifications. This digital representation of the finger is then compared at the authentication 
server, or sometimes even locally, to the comparison sample recorded during the user enroll-
ment. All ten fingers have a different fingerprint pattern and they can be used in authentication 
individually or consecutively to add entropy. In some implementations the user can also add 
backup fingers (e.g. from his left hand) to prepare for potential physical damage rendering the 
primary fingerprints unreadable.  (Maltoni et. al., 2009)
4.3.2 Face recognition
Face recognition applications work in three main stages. First the face has to be digitalized 
with a camera, like a standard webcam or a single-purpose authentication camera. 
The second step is locating the face in the image; if the image has a single face as a major ele-
ment and the contrast to the background is clear, this is an easy task. If the image has multiple 
faces (e.g. in a crowd of people) or a lot of movement, this task becomes significantly more 
difficult. 
The third step is for the software to analyze the spatial geometry of the face, like the distance of 
the eyes and mouth. These results are then compared to the face template saved from the user 
during the enrollment process to confirm the authentication. The false acceptance rate and 
false rejection rate of the face recognition has to be adjusted carefully to fit the use scenario. 
(Coventry, 2005)
4.3.3 Iris scanners
The iris scanner is a high-precision camera that analyzes the vein pattern in the iris, the color-
ed part surrounding the pupil in the eye. The scanner needs a precision camera and alignment 
system that guides the pupil to a right position for imaging. Each human has two distinct iris 
patterns and the possible entropy in the vein positioning makes it extremely improbable to 
have two matching iris pattern in the whole human population. (Weaver, 2006)
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4.3.4 Voice recognition
Like all biometrics, voice recognition authentication consists of two phases: enrollment and 
verification. In enrollment the voice sample of a validated user is saved to a database to be used 
as a comparison for all future verification attempts. The voice authentication can be either text 
dependent or text independent. In text dependent the voiceprint is a pre-defined sentence like 
users name or id number. Text-independent voice authentication can be done with any voice 
sample, but achieving good results requires a lot longer samples at enrolment and verification. 
The minimum sample rate for some text independent systems is 30 seconds, and even this does 
not guarantee high success rate in varying conditions. (Gunson et al., 2011; Trewin et al., 2012
 
4.4 Somebody you know
In addition to the three classical authentication categories, the concept of “somebody you 
know” as a fourth authentication category has been gaining attention. This concept takes the 
age-old approach of human authentication through mutual acquaintance to the era of com-
puter security and location-independent social networks. There are several technical alterna-
tives for building a social authentication system, but the conceptual idea behind all of them is 
to have familiar people to verify the user’s identity as a part of the authentication process. This 
kind of authentication is usually a lot heavier process, as it needs active participation from at 
least one other person who can vouch for the authenticating user. Because of the unknown 
availability of any potential authenticator, it can be difficult to estimate the time needed for the 
authentication. Because of these limitations, most of the current setups use human authentica-
tion as a backup to other methods, e.g. for password resets, or as one additional factor in ultra-
high security applications. (Brainard et al., 2006)
 
4.5 Sharing
In systems and environments where users have to log in to multiple computers, software and 
websites, implementing shared authentication or a single sign-on solution is usually the most 
effective way to improve the user experience without compromising security (Anchan, 2003). 
Shared authentication means that the user has only one account, which he can use to access all 
the organizational resources that previously needed to have separate user accounts. In shared 
authentication the user can use the same credentials, but he has to log in manually every time. 
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With single-sign-on, the manual authentication is required only once, after which the user is 
logged automatically to other services via single sign-on management system. 
Implementing shared authentication or single sign-on can also increase the potential damage 
that one cracked or leaked user account can cause, so it is usually recommended to pay addi-
tional attention to the account security. 
4.5.1 Corporate systems
There are several technical alternatives to implement shared authentication and single sign-
on.  In corporate environments one of the most common alternatives is to extend the reach of 
the main user database, usually Microsoft Active Directory, to authenticate users from a wide 
range of services (Blezard, D.J., 2002). This can be done with several standardized protocols, 
most common one being Lightweight Directory Access Protocol, LDAP (IETF, 2006) 
4.5.2 Online APIs
In web-based environments users can achieve single sign-on to a wide range of services with 
open implementations like OAUTH or OpenID (Kaila, 2008). There are also vendor-specific 
solutions like Facebook Connect that rely on the existing user base of the primary service (Ko, 
2010). The technical implementation of these three solutions varies, but the end result in all of 
them is nearly identical: the user can use his existing account to sign into a new service. The 
new service authenticates him from his old account, e.g. Facebook, via the predefined API. 
4.5.3 TUPAS in Finland
In Finland, most eCommerse providers and many public institutions like Kela, the social in-
surance institution of Finland, are using TUPAS as a shared authentication solution. TUPAS 
is a proprietary authentication solution developed in Finland and currently provided by all 
major Finnish banks. TUPAS allows the sharing of inherently secure Internet banking authen-
tication to other high security logins. (Rissanen, 2010). Some big organizations also use the 
TUPAS authentication as a backup for primary account password recovery, as it is considered 
secure enough method to identify a person. For example the students of Aalto University can 
create and recover their University-wide primary password through a service that utilizes 
TUPAS (Aalto IT, 2013).
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5 Empirical study
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This chapter will introduce the designing and construction of the empirical study. The study 
progress and results will be introduced in chapter six. The empirical study was designed to 
evaluate authentication preferences of business cloud service users. The study follows the steps 
of usability testing methodology defined by Cranor et al. in the book “Security and Usability” 
(2005) and the structure is further based on previous research in evaluating the balance of 
usability and security (Weir et al., 2009). This chapter will present the construction of the em-
pirical study, following the five steps slightly modified from Cranor et al. to better match the 
study structure by Weir et al.: 
1. Purpose and scope definition. Defining the aims of the test 
 (e.g., comparing the usability of two types of devices) and set the test’s limits.
2. Context and roles definition. Defining the context for the experimental scenario, 
 including the simulated environment, user roles and the tasks they need to achieve.  
 Each role must be specified clearly, including the possible actions of a supervisor.
3. User selection. Defining the selection criteria of users based on the selected context  
 and aims of the test. The user sample has to be wide enough to assure statistical
  significance.
4. Task definition. Defining the set of tasks to be executed by each user 
 (sequence of steps, input data and output data).
5. Measurement apparatus design. Choosing a set of metrics and specify their 
 relationships with the usability attributes. Each metric has its own name, description,  
 scale, and procedure to collect the raw data and to compute the measurement.
5.1 Purpose and scope definition
The aim of this study is to compare three alternative two-factor authentication methods com-
monly used in cloud service authentication and answer to the research questions defined in 
the beginning of this thesis. The main focus of this study is in rq3 and it will probably produce 
some additional information for rq2 as well. No additional information for rq1 is assumed to 
be found during the user study. 
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Rq1 Identify a) the common authentication methods used in business cloud authentication 
at the moment and b) emerging new authentication methods suitable for the purpose.
Rq2 What are the most important factors, in addition to the authentication method itself, 
that are affecting the security – usability –balance of the entire authentication process and how 
they can be optimized for the business cloud authentication? 
Rq3 How the usability and security aspects of authentication methods affect the user pref-
erence in method selection?
From the scenarios introduced in chapter 4, this usability study will focus on the scenario that 
fits best with the intended context, scenario 2.
Scenario 2:  Using the virtual desktop through open network at a secure location (e.g. the 
office, home) with a self-managed PC 
 
5.2  Context and roles definition
The scenario is set up to evaluate three different delivery methods of one-time passwords 
(OTP), defined with more details in sections 4.2.2 – 4.2.4: SMS, email and mobile software 
token. 
The social context aims to be as realistic as possible for the intended user group, graduate 
students with work experience, and utilize the real test environment, school premises, as part 
of the context. The scenario is further defined to support the Scenario 2 defined in chapter 4: 
open network, relatively safe environment and self-controlled PC.
Each participant is told that his employer has gotten a new DaaS solution and will be moving 
all the work tasks to that environment. Now the environment is in testing phase and the user 
can try all of the available authentication methods and select one of them to be used with his 
account. When the system is taken into production, the selected method cannot be changed 
easily, so the user has to think his options carefully.
This scenario aims to get the users to better relate the authentication solutions to their personal 
work context. This effect is further strengthened in the account creation phase; in the begin-
ning of the study each user creates a test account with his personal phone number and email 
address. The personal details are not used for anything else than OTP delivery, but the test 
users still have an alternative to use a dummy account if he does not want to use his personal 
information.
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Figure 10. Creating the test account.
The active participants of the test will be the user and the supervisor (experimenter). The role 
of the supervisor will include:
•	 Conducting	the	pre-questionnaire
•	 Briefing	the	user	for	the	tasks
•	 Acting	as	a	customer	support	during	the	test	
•	 Conducting	the	debriefing	phase
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5.3 User selection
The usability study will be conducted with six users who are at the last stages of their Master 
studies in Aalto University. They should already have a moderate amount of relevant work 
experience on their own fields and some of them might already be familiar with two-factor 
authentication in a business context. 
 
5.4 Task definition
 The study will consist of four phases:
Pre-questionnaire (Appendix C)
The pre-questionnaire will record the relevant background info and previous experience 
with cloud services and strong authentication solutions. The pre-questionnaire is done with a 
Google Docs –form, which facilitates easy data handling after the study. 
Briefing
After completing the pre-questionnaire, the users are briefed with the test scenario and given 
the task description. They are also told about the possibility to use the supervisor as a customer 
support if needed, but discouraged to do so with any minor incidents. 
Execution
User starts the test by creating an account for himself and providing the details needed to de-
liver the one-time passwords to him (Figure 10). After creating the account, user logs in with 
his email address and newly invented password. 
 
The user is then presented with three alternative methods for the second factor of the authenti-
cation method, from which he selects one (Figure 11). The order of the method is randomized 
before each test in order to minimize the arrangement bias. After the authentication is success-
ful, the supervisor presents a short questionnaire (Appendix D) to the user about the tested 
method. After the questionnaire, the user is instructed to log out and log back in with the next 
method in the randomized list, repeating the same process until all the methods are tested. 
Debriefing
At the end of the test, users will be given a debriefing interview. 
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The user is then presented with three alternative methods for the second factor of the authenti-
cation method, from which he selects one (Figure 11). The order of the method is randomized 
before each test in order to minimize the arrangement bias. After the authentication is success-
ful, the supervisor presents a short questionnaire (Appendix D) to the user about the tested 
method. After the questionnaire, the user is instructed to log out and log back in with the next 
method in the randomized list, repeating the same process until all the methods are tested. 
Debriefing
At the end of the test, users will be given a debriefing interview. 
 
5.5 Measurement apparatus design
The study will focus on the definition of usability by ISO 9241-11 (ISO, 1998), presented with 
more details in section 2.2.1 of this thesis: the standard measures usability with achieving the 
goals from three axes: Effectiveness, Efficiency and Satisfaction. 
Efficiency will be measured by manually timing the whole login process for each authentica-
tion method. The timing will begin once the user starts typing his email address and ends 
when the first landing page is visible after a successful login. 
Figure 11. Selecting the second factor for the authentication.
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Figure 12. Ranking methods on a 30 cm scale from worst to best
Effectiveness will be measured in terms of task completion, amount and seriousness of task-
hindering issues and amount of help requests from the supervisor.
Satisfaction will be measured with attitude questionnaires after each authentication method. 
The attitude questionnaire is adapted from previous studies (Weir et al., 2006, 2007, 2009), 
consisting of 18 statements about usability-affecting factors (Schneiderman et al., 2004), each 
measured with a 7-point Likert scale (Likert, 1932; Kline, 1999).  The questionnaire includes 
an equal number of positive and negative statements in random order to create a counterbal-
ancing effect, as it is easier for a human mind to agree than disagree with question statements 
(Colman, 2006). For the further analysis, the scoring of the negative questions was inverted to 
be aligned with the positive question set.  The questionnaire is shown in Appendix A. 
The users will also be asked to rank each method, overall, on a 30 cm scale, in which 0 cm is 
“the worst” and 30 cm is “the best” according to their own preferences. The same ranking scale 
will be also used for two other factors of the methods: perceived security and convenience of 
the methods. Figure 12 shows the situation after one of the participants had completed the 
evaluation.
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5.6 Technical setup
The test setup is built with the live authentication demo by a Nordic Edge, a McAfee-owned 
company that specializes in secure authentication products. The demo setup is built around 
three Nordic Edge products, One Time Password Server, Password Self Service and Mobile 
Software Token Pledge. The demo was available through URL http://demo.nordicedge.com/ 
in January 2013, but has been since shut down.
The demo setup will allow all the test users to create their individual accounts and use their 
personal mobile phone and email accounts as authentication delivery methods during the user 
study (Figure 10). When using the demo setup, the users are logging into a web application 
that has no other technical functions than authentication.  (NordicEdge, 2013). 
The intended main function of the demo is to introduce Nordic Edge solutions to potential 
new customers, and as a result the demo website includes several web elements that are not 
related to the authentication process. To make the authentication experience as realistic as 
possible, the excess elements were filtered out during the study by manipulating the Cascading 
Style Sheets (CSS) of the demo on the usability study workstation. The situation before and 
after the filtering is presented in Figure 13.
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Figure 13. Live demo http://demo.nordicedge.com before and after filtering out the unnecessary 
website elements with a CSS editor.
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5.7 Technical setup alternatives
The main purpose of this usability study was to compare the three different authentication 
methods and the demo setup by Nordic Edge was a good fit for the focus. However, in the real 
business cases the authentication is planned as a gateway to the actual services. To actually im-
plement and test a setup that includes all the elements of the real business cloud environment, 
one has two choices: 
1) Conduct the usability study in a real environment and modify it as needed; or
2) Build a realistic business cloud environment for the testing. 
Conducting the tests in a real environment and getting the permission to modify the security 
settings for the test proved to be practically impossible. And even though it would have been 
possible, even a really well-prepared study would have caused a potential security and func-
tionality risks to the environment and led to moral and monetary responsibilities for the study 
organizer. 
Building a realistic business cloud environment for the testing would have been possible, but 
it would have included building a lot of background services, all of which would have stayed 
invisible to the test users during the usability study of the authentication process. And still, the 
end result would have been indistinguishable close to the demo setup in the selected alterna-
tive. This chapter will present a plan for building such an environment to give an example of 
the business cloud system where these studied authentication solutions could be used. Because 
a detailed plan of such system would be almost a thesis in itself, some of the technical details 
are omitted. The system design is based on the technical documentation by Citrix Systems 
(Citrix, 2013) and personal experience from building similar systems.
5.7.1 Deciding the platform
For the past two or three decades, one would have started with a question about what kind of 
server should be bought for this kind of setup. However, during the past few years IaaS (Infra-
structure as a Service) platforms have grown up in popularity and functionality to be the most 
feasible alternative for many kinds of environments. This is especially true for a small-scale test 
setup like this, needed only for a limited time. Thanks to scalable pricing, increases in aver-
age networks speeds and many other benefits, the compatibility of IaaS as a platform building 
enterprise cloud services is increasing all the time (Sripanidkulchai, 2012). Of course there 
are still many situations where a dedicated physical server is still a better alternative, but the 
detailed analysis of the differences falls outside of the scope of this thesis. 
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On the vendor side the obvious choice for the implementation of this thesis was IBM’s Smart-
Cloud Enterprice (SCE), enterprise-class IaaS service that is a part of IBM’s larger SmartCloud 
framework. The main reason for the selection was that the SCE platform and support resourc-
es were easily available, as IBM was the sponsor of this thesis. As IaaS services are planned 
to maximize compatibility with the existing infrastructure, the planning and implementation 
would have been nearly identical for all the other big IaaS services like Amazon’s EC2, Micro-
soft’s Azure and many others, with possible service-specific technical limitations. 
5.7.2 Deciding the software components 
As stated in the thesis introduction, the focus for the practical implementation is in the Citrix 
Systems’ products. The selected Citrix components for the test setup were Citrix XenApp and 
Citrix Storefront. For a hardware server setup it would have been possible to install a XenSer-
ver hypervisor platform to manage and share the server resources to several virtual computers, 
but for this setup that function is handled by SCE as a part of the IaaS implementation. 
Citrix XenApp
XenApp is Citrix’s software virtualization app, which can be customized to provide a DaaS 
experience by combining the individual virtualized software launchers on top of one appli-
cation running the desktop experience with components of Windows Server 2008. Without 
the customization XenApp could be considered a pure SaaS (Software as a Service) platform. 
However, after the customization the end result and user experience is fully compatible with 
a pure virtualized desktop. Citrix would also have a product for pure desktop virtualization, 
XenDesktop, which could publish a full image of any popular Windows OS. The main reasons 
for selecting XenApp over XenDesktop were licensing issues and small size of the planned 
software setup. 
With the current license agreements, Microsoft requires a full OS license for every virtual 
computer running a desktop OS (Operating systems like Windows 8, Windows 7, Windows 
Vista and Windows XP). This makes the underlying idea of any cloud service, dynamic re-
source scaling, really difficult to implement and introduces additional license costs. However, 
with XenApp, it is possible to share the Windows Server 2008’s desktop as an “application” to 
several users, and this is covered in Microsoft’s server license.
The size of the setup environment and the amount of needed resources was another deciding 
factor. The whole test setup was implementable on XenApp with only three Windows 2008 R2 
servers, described with more details in the next section. A full XenDesktop setup with similar 
functionality would have required at least five Windows 2008 R2 servers and an additional 
virtual machine instance for each of the virtualized desktops.
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Windows 2008 R2
The recommended installation platform for all the software components in this setup is Micro-
soft’s server operating system. Currently the newest supported OS version for most of the com-
ponents is Windows 2008 R2, which can be installed easily on the SCE IaaS platform. There 
are several server roles and software components to be installed on the servers, some of which 
are not compatible to be installed on the same server instance. To increase the system capac-
ity, these roles could be shared to multiple servers. Or the individual roles could be divided 
between several servers, called a cluster, to support more users. However, as this is a test setup 
just for a few users, the roles can be combined on a minimum setup requiring three separate 
Windows 2008 R2 server instances from the SCE cloud.
•	 The first server will host the Active Directory domain, which connects the servers and acts 
as a user database for the first- and second factor authentication (see details from section 
4.5.1). This server also hosts the license server for the Citrix products.
•	 The second server will host the XenApp setup, consisting of the server components and the 
virtualized applications to be published. In addition it will host the Citrix Web Interface, a 
service that allows the users to connect and authenticate themselves to the XenApp server 
with their Active Directory accounts. This server will also host all of the background ser-
vices needed for these functions.
•	 The third server hosts the software setup for the second-factor authentication, which in 
this test setup is NordicEdge One Time Password Server, allowing the authentication with 
SMS, email or a Pledge client, among other available methods. This OTP server uses the 
Active Directory on the first server as a user database, thus the two servers are connected 
with standard LDAP protocol.
NordicEdge One Time Password Server
One Time Password (OTP) Server is a product of NordicEdge, a company that is current-
ly owned by the security giant McAffee. OTP server is one of several similar authentication 
server products, which connects to other services and provides a wide array of additional con-
nectivity and authentication alternatives for them. OTP Server was selected because its market 
share and previous positive experiences of the author. The end-user experience of OTP server 
is identical to other similar products as all the end-user parameters (message content, code 
length and validity time) are fully configurable. 
In this setup the OTP server uses the Active Directory (AD) database of the setup to store the 
information needed for the second factor authentication: phone numbers for SMS messages, 
email addresses and Pledge identification details. All these details are stored under the user’s 
personal database entry, the user account. As a context, this is the same kind of account that 
most of the office workers use every day to log in to their networked Windows computers. 
49
In single factor authentications the users would log in to the Citrix Web Interface with their 
AD accounts and get access to XenApp applications right after that. When the second-factor 
authentication is implemented, the users have to first authenticate themselves with the AD 
account. After this they are directed to the second factor authentication. The second factor 
authentication can be pre-defined to one specific method, or then the user can choose from 
two or more alternative methods. In this test setup the user could choose to use SMS, email or 
software-based Pledge client.
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6 Results
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This chapter will present the progress and results of the empirical study. The study, constructed 
in the previous chapter, was performed in January 2013 in the Helsinki metropolitan area, 
Finland. The test participants (n=6) were 23 – 27 years old students doing their Master studies 
in Aalto University. The more detailed demographic information is presented in section 6.1. 
Sections 6.2 – 6.5 will present the usability and security data gathered during the study. Then 
section 6.6 will present the qualitative data that was gathered during the study but did not fit 
the predefined metrics. 
6.1 Demographics
The demographics of the conducted study reflect the planned user selection. Six people were 
interviewed for the study, half of them male and half of them female. The average age of par-
ticipants was 25 years and they all reported having two or three years of work experience. 
They were either finalizing their master degree or graduated during the past year. The study 
background of the participants varied a lot, self-reported backgrounds were: Information and 
Service Management, Structural Engineering, Industrial Design, Information Networks, UX 
& Concept Designer, and Product Development.
52
In the freeform part of the pre-questionnaire, most of the people commented the SMS OTP to 
be the most usable and most secure solution they had used before the study. Five out of six par-
ticipants reported having previous experience with strong authentication methods; all five had 
used SMS OTP, two had used a SecurID –device and one had used email OTP. One of the test 
participants reported having no previous experience with any strong authentication method, 
when “strong authentication method” was defined in the questionnaire to be anything more 
than username and password. In addition to the predefined answers (Figure 14), the question-
naire had a freeform field “other”, but no other authentication methods were listed. This might 
be a small fault in a test setup as the questions were leading towards separate technological 
solutions. Some of the participants later mentioned their Internet banking accounts and re-
lated authentication method, the cardboard password list typical to all major Finnish banks, 
as a strong authentication method. It is highly probable that all study participants use Internet 
banking regularly (Tilastokeskus, 2011) even though it was not mentioned by anyone in this 
stage of the pre-questionnaire.
Figure 14. Strong authentication methods used by participants.
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All of the test participants had at least some experience on cloud services (Figure 15). In ad-
dition to the predefined answers, users also mentioned two other services: Dropbox and pro-
ject file management (the user did not remember the exact name of the service). The previ-
ous experiences of the users were mostly focused on the “light” SaaS solutions like webmail 
(100%) and CRM (67%). “When working correctly, virtualization is really good tool. On the 
other hand, single-function web-based tools that need separate logins tend to be less usable, 
especially because each of them usually having separate authentication.”, says one of the par-
ticipants. 
Only half of the users had some experience or knowledge about DaaS services (Figure 16), 
which was taken into account while going through the test scenario. The depth of the explain-
ing the scenario was adjusted to match the perceived knowledge level of the individual user.
Figure 15. Cloud services used by the participants.
Figure 16. Participant experience with desktop virtualization.
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6.2 Usability – Efficiency
Timing the login process in two parts was used to measure method efficiency as a part of us-
ability. The order of these three second factor authentication methods was randomized, but 
all of the methods shared the identical first-factor authentication. The first part of the timing 
was the first factor login the users made with theirs self-generated accounts, consisting of an 
email address and a password. As assumed, this shows a noticeable improvement as the users 
repeated the login process, improving from 17,75 seconds average on the first login to 14,27 
seconds average on the third login. The average login times and their standard deviations are 
presented in Table 2.
Average Login Time (s)
Average Login Time (s)
Third LoginSecond LoginFirst Login
17,75
0,93
14,87
1,32
14,27
1,37
After completing the first-factor authentication the participants continued straight to the sec-
ond-factor authentication, choosing the testing method according to the random pre-selec-
tion. This part was timed separately; the results can be seen in Table 3.
As assumed, SMS was the fasted method as it does not require any additional authentication to 
see the code, like logging into the email account, and it requires less action steps than generat-
ing an OTP code with Pledge client. 
On the email OTP, there was no significant difference between the authentication times even 
though the participants were told that they could read their emails any way they wanted. They 
used three different devices for reading the OTP emails: three of the six participants logged in 
with the test PC, two of the participants used their own smartphones and one of the partici-
pants used her own laptop she had with her. All of the users who used their personal devices 
had the auto-login feature enabled on their personal devices and they stated that it felt it more 
comfortable than logging in on a new device would have felt.
There was no relevant variance with age or educational background that would have affected 
the results, as participants were quite homogenous in those aspects. Previous experience with 
Table 2. Average login times with the first-factor authentication.
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the authentication methods and overall work experience with computer systems seemed to 
have a positive effect on shortening the authentication times, but the test setup and amount of 
participants does not allow for a statistically significant analysis on these factors. 
Average Login Time (s)
Average Login Time (s)
PledgeEmailSMS
25,02
4,40
40,23
2,52
34,33
4,72
Table 3. Average login times with second-factor authentication.
6.3 Usability – Effectiveness
All participants were able to complete the login and secondary authentication without any 
major issues. None of the participants needed instructions how to process the code or where 
to retrieve it. 
One participant was having her first experience with SMS-based authentication and was look-
ing at the blank field titled “One Time Password:”. She was about to ask “Should I have another 
password for this or…”, when her question was interrupted by the SMS notification. This im-
mediately guided her to retrieve the code without finishing the original question. 
Another participant was testing the Pledge and he was given a test phone with pre-installed 
client software. After completing the first-factor login, he just looks at the phone and does 
not start the software. After waiting for a while, he is prompted by the supervisor to start the 
software and he is able to complete the authentication without any further issues. According 
to his own description of the event, he was waiting the Pledge client to provide a similar push 
notification of the OTP code than the two earlier methods, SMS and email had. 
Both of the issues were, in high probability, one-time errors. In the debriefing interview both 
of the users recognized the error situation and were able to fully and correctly analyze what 
went wrong, so it should be safe to assume that they were able to learn from the errors to pre-
vent them easily in the future.  
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6.4 Usability – Satisfaction
The satisfaction element of usability was measured with a seven-step Likert questionnaire de-
scribed in section 5.5. The results of the 18 questions presented to participants (Appendix A) 
are presented in Table 4. The mean usability scores (Table 5) were further derived from these 
answers.
SMS was evaluated with positive attitudes (over 5 on the Likert scale) on 8 of the 18 attributes 
(44,4%). The lowest result came from the need for improvement, but this attribute was consist-
ently low on each of the tested methods, as all of the participants had some ideas for improving 
the methods. The second lowest attribute was the sense of security, which was still better than 
with email but considerably worse than with Pledge. On the positive side SMS was praised for 
its simplicity and speed of use.
Email got the least amount of positive attitudes from the tested methods, 7 out of 18 (38,9%) 
and it had also three borderline-negative attributes: the lack of trust, most need for improve-
ment and least likable for using the method again. On the positive side email was seen as con-
venient and easy to use solution that did not need any instructions.
Pledge got the most positive attitudes, 9 out of 18 (50%) and it had only one attitude that was 
significantly worse compared to the other methods: knowing what to do next. It was also able 
to get just barely the best score in the need for improvement, but the received 3.67 (out of 7) 
clearly indicate that the participants thought that this method would still need improving. On 
the positive side, Pledge excelled on degree on trust, reliability and getting clearly the highest 
score in the question whether the participants would use the method again. 
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Would use the method 
again 
Table 4. Average login times with second-factor authentication.
I felt this method was 
reliable
4,5
5
3,83
4,33
5,67
5,5
Frustration
Speed of use
5,33
6,17
4,67
4,67
4,83
5,67
Improvement needed
User-friendliness
3,5
4,83
2,83
5
3,67
5
Degree of enjoyment 4,67 4,5 4,33
Degree of security
Need for instructions
4,17
4,83
4
5
5,33
4
Degree of convenience
Concentration
5
4,67
5,17
5,17
5,33
4,5
Ease generating code 6,33 6 5
Degree of trust
Stress
PledgeEmailSMS
4,83
4,83
3,83
4
5,33
4,5
Method too 
complicated
Degree of control
5
5,17
4
4,5
4,33
5
Knew what to do next
Matching expectations
5,17
4,33
5,17
5,33
3,5
4
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6.5 Comparative rating
The participants rated their overall preference (quality) of the three compared methods on 
a 30 cm scale as described in the section 5.5. They also evaluated separately the security and 
convenience of the methods on the same scale. As the users were encouraged to change the 
rating after testing each method if they felt it was necessary, the ranking score represents their 
opinion of the ranking of these factors. The mean ratings are shown in Table 6.
Mean
Standard Deviation
PledgeEmailSMS
4,91
2,67
4,56
3,04
4,75
2,97
N 6 6 6
Table 5. Mean usability results from the methods
Convenience
Security 
PledgeEmailSMS
19,58
18
17,58
12,92
18,25
20,75
Quality (overall) 20,75 15,83 21,75
Table 6. Comparative ratings between the authentication methods
Overall the methods were really even in the evaluation. There were no clear peak attributes 
inside any of the methods. The overall score between the methods was also quite even, as the 
difference between the best and the worst mean usability rating was only 0,35 on a scale of 7 
(Table 5).
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To visualize all the measurement attributes (convenience, security, quality and mean usabil-
ity), the individual attribute scores were scaled to a table, where the top score of one represents 
the maximum value for each category. The results are presented in Figure 17.
 
Figure 17. Usability, quality, convenience and security of the methods scores, maximum scores 
scaled to one. 
In the overall comparison the Pledge was a winner with 1 point difference to SMS. Email was 
the least preferred solution, losing to Pledge with almost 6 points. From the individual factors, 
email lost to both SMS and Pledge by almost 5 and 8 points, while the difference between SMS 
and winning Pledge was 2,75 points. The third evaluation factor, convenience, saw the most 
even distribution of the three; all the methods were inside a 2-point distribution. Convenience 
was also the only factor that Pledge lost to SMS, with 1,25 points difference.
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6.6 User insights
During the usability testing and the following debriefing interview, the participants had many 
comments on their perception of the tested authentication methods. Some of the responses 
are presented below, with the quotes taken from the participant comments made during the 
user testing and the debriefing interviews. Only two of the six interviews were in English; for 
the rest of the interviews the quotes are translated from Finnish with an effort to preserve the 
content as close to the original comments as possible. All participant comments can be found 
from the Appendix B.
6.6.1 SMS OTP
Many of the participants commented that SMS 
messages and their phone overall feels very per-
sonal and they felt this to have a direct connec-
tion to the security as well, especially compared 
to a lot less personal email. Having the phone al-
ways physically with you adds to the security, as 
one participant commented: “The phone feels a 
lot more secure and personal. Of course the losing 
and breaking are possible issues, but you don’t re-
ally think it would happen to you”. One of the par-
ticipants had recent bad experiences about losing 
several phones in rapid succession, and as a result 
she admitted being more cautious about the secu-
rity of SMS OTP: “I lose my phone quite often so 
security would really worry me”.
Another issue with SMS OTP was the required 
connection to the mobile network. Few of the 
participants have had trouble recently with their 
mobile reception in their office building, especially 
in the underground levels. The really remote loca-
tions with critical work tasks were also potentially 
really serious issues: “How would this work in crit-
ical situations at a difficult location like a remote 
windmill park? The backup methods and handling 
problems should be really smooth and efficient”. 
Having a backup method for SMS felt really im-
Figure 18. SMS OTP on an Android mobile 
phone
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portant for many users, even for some of those users who preferred the method as an overall 
solution.
Code length and complexity was also mentioned; the participants appreciated the current code 
formatting (4 numbers) and told that it would be a lot less convenient if the code length or 
complexity would increase: “The length of the code has a big effect on convenience, 6 char-
acters would be a lot less convenient than 4 characters in SMS, really stretching the work 
memory”. They felt that the added complexity would not really add security, as the code is valid 
only for a short period of time and is good only for a single use.
6.6.2 Email OTP
Email was praised for its convenience. Most of the 
participants used automatic login for email on their 
smartphones and laptops. This made the email to 
have good reviews on the convenience compari-
son. However, most participants also commented 
on the flipside of the convenience: “Email feels a 
lot less secure as it’s always open, it can be hacked 
and you’ll get a lot of spam” – the comment sums 
up the opinions about the email OTP as a method. 
Spam, security breaches, hacking and the overall 
amount of daily email were the most common rea-
sons people disliked email as an OTP method.
Some of the participants felt that they just did not 
want to receive any additional email for any reason 
and wanted to keep the authentication separate. 
In two cases the company webmail also used the 
same account details that would probably be used 
as a primary authentication method in the DaaS 
scenario, so using corporate email as a secondary 
authentication would not bring any real additional 
security.
Email was mentioned a few times as a possible 
backup for SMS or Pledge. The other two methods 
were generally preferred over email, but partici-
pants realized both methods were relying heavily 
Figure 19. Email OTP message on an 
Android phone
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on the functionality of the mobile network or their personal smartphone. “SMS feels the most 
usable solution and secure enough, but I would like to have email as a backup if e.g. my battery 
dies”.  
In email OTP the opinions about the code length were divided; the people who preferred read-
ing the emails with their smartphone (n=2) preferred shorter and simpler codes with the same 
reasoning than with SMS. However, most of the people who preferred to read the emails with 
the test PC (n =3) said that the code complexity does not really matter, as they can copy and 
paste it anyway from the email to the login window.
Reading emails and SMS messages on the smartphone revealed one additional security issue. 
Even though all the participants were using lockscreen passcodes, some of the smartphone 
models still revealed the received OTP code in the message preview without opening the 
phone. This could be avoided by instructing the users to disable message previews or modify-
ing the OTP message body so, that the actual OTP code is not included in the previewed part 
of the message. 
6.6.3 Pledge client
Pledge was the favorite authentication method for 
most of the users: “Pledge needs more effort but 
still feels more convenient than the other meth-
ods. The few extra clicks are really easy to learn 
and repeat with muscle memory without any 
thinking after that.” The participants also felt, that 
even though using Pledge was not the fastest way 
to authenticate for any of them, the interaction de-
sign of the software made it feel faster and more 
enjoyable to use: “Pledge felt quick even though 
it had more clicks, the software design like rolling 
numbers in the code generation helped that”. The 
McAffee brand was also recognized; almost all of 
the participants remembered that in the debrief-
ing interview. Two of the participants stated that 
seeing a familiar and reliable brand like McAffee 
during the Pledge usage heightened their sense of 
security.
One participant commented that Pledge even felt 
more familiar way to authenticate than SMS and 
email, even though she reported having no expe-
rience with any strong authentication methods: 
““This might be a bit old-fashioned way of think-
Figure 20. Pledge client on an Android 
phone
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ing, but pledge feels almost like a paper version, like the cardboard badges you get from the 
bank”. Many participants also liked the fact that Pledge made it possible to keep the authentica-
tion separate from the already overflowing SMS and email inboxes. However, the participants 
were also worried about the possible issues with smartphone malfunctions or misplacing the 
phone altogether.
In the test scenario the pledge software came pre-installed “by your company’s IT-support”, 
and one participant stated that this is how it should be – he would not want to use his own 
phone or try to install the software himself: “Pledge client installations should be handled by 
the helpdesk. I would also definitely need a work phone for that; I wouldn’t want to use my 
own phone.”
6.6.4 Strong authentication overall
The users saw the need for strong authentication in the test scenario and had a positive attitude 
towards the idea of having a secondary authentication method in the login process: “Second-
ary authentication is really good, it adds to sense of security and sense of control”. They also 
saw the need for two-factor authentication outside the test scenario in their everyday comput-
ing: “Bank, personal information and internet shops would feel worth of two-factor authenti-
cation”. 
The tested methods were appreciated and even though the competition between the three 
tested methods was tough, two of the participants clearly commented that they were better 
than the methods they are currently using: “Any of these methods feels a lot better than the 
paper password lists used with the Finnish banks”.
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7 Conclusions and discussion 
65
This chapter will present the results of the thesis research. Section 7.1 will summarize the 
thesis by answering to the research questions. Section 7.2 will discuss the overall validity and 
accuracy of the results. Section 7.3 will present the practical implementations of the thesis for 
designing business cloud authentication and section 7.4 will present ideas for future research.
7.1 Answering the research questions
Rq1 Identify a) the common authentication methods used in business cloud
 authentication at the moment and b) emerging new authentication
  methods suitable for the purpose.
The first aim of this thesis was to get a wide overview of the various authentication methods 
and strategies and reflect their validity in business cloud settings. This was achieved in chapter 
4, which gives a detailed description of the identified methods and strategies.
Two major trends in business cloud authentication were identified: shared authentication and 
multi-factor authentication. Shared authentication aims to reduce the amount of user accounts 
needed on a daily basis by sharing the login details, for example Microsoft Active Directory ac-
count, to be used in multiple cloud services in addition to the workstation login. This improves 
authentication usability and in most cases also security, as the users do not have to cope with 
excess amount of user accounts (FIPS, 1985). 
On the other hand, the cloud services are more open to the attacks because of their online con-
nectivity. At the same time the security of the traditional combination of user ID and a pass-
word is eroding, as the increasing computational power makes it easier to crack the passwords 
with brute force and dictionary attacks (Honan, 2012). This has led to an increased adaptation 
of multi-factor authentication in business cloud services. Multi-factor authentication com-
bines two or more authentication method categories for increased security: something you 
know, something you have, something you are or somebody you know. 
At the moment almost all of the multi-factor authentication solutions for business cloud ser-
vices are focusing on the categories “something you know” (e.g. a password) and “something 
you have” (e.g. a RSA tag). Implementing biometric authentication, “something you are”, in 
cloud authentication is currently challenging, as a secure biometric identification requires a 
scanner that can take accurate biometric measurements. In addition, a secure biometric au-
thentication needs an environment that can guarantee that the biometric sample is provided in 
a legitimate manner, as the samples are easy to forge, for example by lifting a fingerprint from 
a drinking glass. In cases of stolen authentication information, a password is easy to reset. But 
66
resetting the fingerprints of the user would cause severe pain and risk a permanent physical 
damage (Coventry, 2005). Both of these limitations of biometric authentication can be solved 
in a secure, fixed authentication environment, but that would negate most of the mobility- and 
multi-platform benefits of a cloud environment.  
The fourth authentication category, somebody you know, is getting more attention in cloud 
authentication especially as a recovery option (Brainard et al., 2006). This method is still fair-
ly unknown in the business context and it might encounter some psychological hindrances. 
Some people are considering an error in authentication, like forgetting a password, as a highly 
personal failure that they do not wish to share with their colleagues (Adams et al., 1999). This 
was confirmed by one of the empirical study participants, who strongly emphasized that he 
would never want to bother his coworkers with his authentication problems and admit forget-
ting a password if he could avoid it in any way.
The sensor capabilities of the mobile devices are improving all the time and some of these sen-
sors can already be used for authentication. For example a facial authentication to unlock the 
device can be achieved easily by using the front-facing camera of a mobile phone. At the mo-
ment the resolution and capabilities of the mobile sensors are easy to bypass with a fake bio-
metric input. But as the sensor accuracy improves and the sensors become ubiquitous enough, 
biometrics might become a valid authentication method in the business cloud.
Another emerging category in business cloud authentication is collaboration and authentica-
tion sharing with private cloud services. At the moment most corporate services rely on hav-
ing a complete control of the user data and considering external, especially consumer-grade, 
user data as inherently untrustworthy. However, the customer-grade services like Facebook 
and Gmail are becoming more and more important for their users, and this is starting to 
reflect in their security and reliability as well. Especially Google has implemented many al-
ternative authentication methods and multi-factor authentication. Combining this develop-
ment with secure authentication sharing protocols like OpenID and OAUTH, the commercial 
services might become at least one plausible factor in multi-factor authentication. This kind 
of development can already be seen with a Finnish internet banking authentication sharing 
system TUPAS, which is used for example to authenticate password resets in Aalto University 
(Aalto IT, 2013). 
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Rq2 What are the most important factors, in addition to the authentication 
 method itself, that are affecting the security – usability –balance of the 
 entire authentication process and how they can be optimized for the
 business cloud authentication? 
The currently most popular authentication method, a combination of user ID and password, 
is being eroded by security concerns and more efficient cracking solutions, thus the more ad-
vanced and multi-factor solutions are gaining popularity. Excluding some forms of biometric 
authentication, the users will still forget their passwords, lose their SecurID tags or break their 
authenticating mobile phone, which leads to the need of resetting the authentication to a new 
password or to a new device (Bonneau, 2010). This also creates one possible attack vector that 
can destroy any of the authentication methods if the process is not designed properly. During 
the past year alone, attackers using the automatic password reset (Honan, 2012) and customer 
support (Cardinal, 2012) have accounted for many of the most damaging attacks against the 
legitimate users. There are several existing possibilities to counter this kinds of knowledge-
based attacks, like requiring strong alternative authentication or physically authenticating the 
user before resetting the online authentication. One big emerging trend is also using the fourth 
authentication category, “somebody you know” (section 4.4) to support the online authentica-
tion resetting.  
Another cornerstone of a successful authentication strategy is communicating with the users 
frequently about the security issues, helping them to select the most secure authentication 
methods and especially giving them the motivation to actually use the selected methods (Ad-
ams, 1999). No matter how advanced the technological solution is, users will be able to break it 
or bypass it if it is not aligned with their mindset and workflow (Renaud, 2012). In addition to 
adjusting the technical authentication to be as usable as possible, it is also important to adjust 
the psychological usability of the whole authentication process. It is essential to help the users 
to understand the reasoning for authentication in order for them to include it as a natural and 
functional part of their workflow. 
Rq3 How the usability and security aspects of authentication methods 
 affect the user preference in method selection?
When given a possibility to select from multiple authentication alternatives during the study, 
the study participants clearly put more emphasis on the security than usability or convenience, 
as seen in section 6.5. The overall usability scores of the three studied methods were really close 
to each other; the difference of the best and the worst method was only 0.35 points on a 7-point 
scale (5%). The security aspect of the methods had bigger variance in the test scores, 7.83 on a 
30-point scale (26,1%) and the results correlated strongly with the user preference and evalu-
ated overall method quality. Many of the test participants commented, that if the authentica-
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tion is done daily or several times a day, as it was described in the test setup, even email OTP, 
the method with worst usability score of the tested methods, would be easy to learn after a few 
tries and repeat indefinitely after that. Like one of the test participants commented, “Pledge 
needs more effort but still feels more convenient than the other methods. The few extra clicks 
are really easy to learn and repeat with muscle memory without any thinking after that.”
Most of the test participants agreed, that they preferred security to usability in the scope of the 
three tested methods. However, during the debriefing interview some of the participants also 
mentioned that it is important that the usability has to be over a certain threshold, otherwise 
the security starts to lose importance. Defining such a threshold is highly subjective as it is af-
fected by the many internal and external factors, as discussed in this thesis.
7.2 Validity and credibility of the study
The importance of usability has been recognized by the security- and authentication software 
makers (Whitten et al, 1999; NordicEdge 2013) and many improvements have been already 
made on that front during the recent years. Some of the previous research from the past decade 
(Weir et al., 2006, Whitten et al. 1999) shows a greater variance in usability evaluations and 
some of the previously tested solutions were not able to even pass the usability threshold of the 
test participants. 
The goal of this thesis was to test a representative set of most popular current business cloud 
authentication methods, which was achieved. The tested methods were, however, quite ho-
mogenous and restricted to one authentication method category, “something you have”. The 
cloud context itself set quite many restrictions in selection of the tested authentication meth-
ods, as the authentication had to be independent of the used device and ubiquitous enough to 
be available for normal businesses. 
With the current devices, having only a limited sensory and connectivity capabilities, the uni-
versal cloud authentication solutions can rely on only a limited set of input types. This ex-
cludes biometrics and most of the other device-based solutions like smartcards from the list 
of universal cloud authentication alternatives. And as biometrics has been one of the most 
varying subset from the usability-point-of-view (Coventry, 2005), this exclusion already limits 
the potential variance in the usability results of the cloud authentication. Some specific cloud 
services used in controlled environments, for example patient information systems in hospi-
tals, can rely on to a more varying set of authentication methods as the accessing devices can 
be pre-defined. 
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The relatively small variance between the tested methods might be one explanation for the 
small (under 5%) variance for the usability score in section 6.4. However, as the overall results 
show a big variance between the tested four methods, and the method selection covered a large 
part of the currently used business cloud authentication solutions, it can be assumed that the 
method selection was wide enough for the selected scope.  
The amount of participants in the study was relatively small and the group was homogenous 
in some, but not all, demographic criteria. The study gave a good description of the selected 
user category, under 30 year old students or professionals with academic education. However, 
as the business cloud authentication solutions are often implemented for the whole company, 
the results might not be directly applicable for all business environments. In many situations 
age, previous technical experience and level of education will affect the perceived usability and 
security of the solution (Lightner, 2003). 
Users with significantly different demographics might prefer more familiar solutions like SMS, 
or the perceived usability of software-based solutions like Pledge mobile client might be lower. 
Still, the study showed that all of the authentication methods were easily adapted by novices, 
most of whom had no previous experience of such methods. Some users with less technical 
skills or experience might need a bit more guidance with the different methods or bit longer 
time to adapt to them. 
7.3 Implementing the results in practice when 
 designing business cloud authentication
Multiple-factor authentication is more secure and more usable alternative than implementing 
traditional password-based authentication with extended password security requirements. In 
theory, requiring long, complicated and unique passwords that have to be changed frequently 
would increase the system security. However, in practice these requirements are often leading 
to reduced usability and users inventing workarounds against the system, leading to overall 
weaker security. Using multiple-factor authentication reduces the stress on one authentication 
method and adds security without compromising usability.
Business cloud services should have at least two-factor authentication. In some ultra-secure 
environments three-factor authentication or even specially designed biometrics authentica-
tion might bring additional security if the necessity of such authentication is communicated 
well to the users. However, if the reasoning for the strong authentication arrangement is not 
explained when the authentication is implemented, a big part of the security benefits is eroded 
as the users start to develop their workarounds.  
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In some situations, the False Rejection Rate (FRR, system not authenticating the authorized 
users) could become a very serious problem. For example when the employees are located or 
travel to foreign countries, SMS OTP messages might not be delivered properly. The authen-
tication technology is generally planned for reliability and these kinds of glitches are rare, but 
they do happen. In addition, implementing an alternative second-factor authentication is usu-
ally very cost-efficient; most of the commonly used authentication software already contain 
the support for several authentication alternatives. Increasing the user alternatives also has the 
added benefit for optimizing the overall authentication usability, as the users can select their 
most preferred alternative instead of conforming to the single authentication method. 
7.4 Ideas for future research
Restricted, precisely defined environments like hospitals and government offices are starting 
to implement a growing part of their daily tasks with cloud services that still require a height-
ened security and individual accountability. These would be really interesting environments to 
test the suitability of biometric authentication or “something you have” –type of authentication 
that is based on restricted authentication technology already used in such premises. One inter-
esting example of this kind of solutions would have been Finnish Toimikortti, which is already 
widely used in the healthcare sector for various authentication solutions. 
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Appendix A : Usability of security in Likert scale
Based on Weir et al., 2006, 2007, 2009; Cranor et al. 2005, Likert 1932
To balance the positive and negative responses, half of the questions were 
inverted to a negative setting. These are listed below with (INV) –tag.
1. I found this method trustworthy
2. I felt under stress while using the method (INV)
3. Using this method was too complicated (INV)
4. I felt in control when using this method
5. When using this method I didn’t always know what to do next (INV)
6. This method did not match my expectations (INV)
7. I would be happy to use this method again
8. I felt this method was reliable
9. Using the method was very frustrating (INV)
10. Using this method was quick
11. I feel that this method needs a lot of improvement (INV)
12. I found this method ‘user-friendly’
13. I did not enjoy using this method (INV)
14. Using this method felt secure
15. I needed instructions to use this method (INV)
16. I thought this method was convenient
17. I had to concentrate hard to use the method (INV)
18. Knowing how to generate the code was easy.
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Appendix B : Participant comments from the 
debriefing interview
Participant 1 (27 years old, female, Information and Service Man-
agement)
All the methods were quite convenient.
SMS and email were more familiar, so they seemed more convenient. Pledge was new, but it 
would probably be as convenient.
Laptop logs automatically to email, so it feels like a more insecure alternative
Phone is usually with her and feels more secure than laptop that might be out of sight longer.
Phone feels more personal than a computer, so it feels more secure as well
Secondary authentication is really good, it adds to sense of security and sense of control.
In reality it might not be more secure in the end, because your computer or phone is usually 
just lying around.
Really liked that the OTP code included only numbers. From email it is easy to copy paste, but 
writing long codes with big and small letters, numbers and “something really random”
It’s already secondary authentication, so the complexity of the code doesn’t really seem rel-
evant.
It’s ok to see the OTP code when writing it to the website, as it is just for one use. Hiding it 
would add difficulty to the writing, but would not create any additional security
Participant 2 (27 years old, male, Structural Engineering)
Could the pre-existing bank authentication used for this as well? Or at least as a backup if the 
user can’t use the primary method.
Pledge client installations should be handled by the helpdesk. I would also definitely need a 
work phone for that; I wouldn’t want to use my own phone.
Using colleagues as a backup authentication (“somebody you know”) might work, but it would 
need a lot of practice. Usually people don’t want to admit their mistakes. 
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How would these work in a critical situations at a difficult location like a remote windmill 
park? The backup methods and handling problems should be really smooth and efficient.
I would like to do the strong authentication only once per workday, it should be enough. 
What if I have problems with my smartphone and have to use my backup phone
Pledge would be great: Less SMS (I get too much of them already) and it works with a bad 
reception
Our webmail has the same login details than our desktop (Windows AD) - the email as a sec-
ond factor would not work with this setup.
The need for extra logins and the distribution of needed knowledge between several different 
systems is sometimes annoying.
I’ve got a folder called “account details” (“tunnistautuminen”) in my email. It has all the ran-
domly used work accounts that I would otherwise forget. Nobody is probably interested with 
the content, as they are only tools, standard libraries etc., and stuff that people can access a lot 
easier in other ways than stealing my accounts.
It would be really helpful to have some consulting and teaching the basic principles like mem-
ory rules at work, especially for workers that are not that experienced with technology.
I’m creating my own password with a memory rule: a basic part + context part (from the ser-
vice name) + the changing part. The changing part changes regularly and I can usually get in 
at least after trying 2 or 3 changing parts around the account creation time.
Participant 3 (24 years old, female, Industrial Design)
Strong authentication was easy to use; I didn’t have any big problems
Email felt like the most difficult solution because of the extra effort needed for the login. How-
ever, it would be a lot easier if I had been using auto login on my own PC
Pledge would be the best solution, as it doesn’t burden the other messaging channels. I would 
like to keep authentication separate from my own emails and SMS
Pledge, being an offline service, feels a lot more reliable than especially email. Spam and pos-
sible security breaches reduce the position of the email a lot.
Pledge feels a lot more like the cardboard badges you get from the bank. 
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“This might be a bit old-fashioned way of thinking, but pledge feels almost like a paper version, 
compared to SMS and email”
Participant 4 (23 years old, male, Information Networks)
“Wow, a pop-up message” - SMS arriving as a special message (off-inbox popup) was techni-
cally impressing for the test subject.
Email is open all the time, so it’s clearly the most usable
Email feels a lot less secure as it’s always open, it can be hacked and you’ll get a lot of spam.
The phone feels a lot more secure and personal. Of course the losing and breaking are possible 
issues, but you don’t really think it would happen to you.
The length of the code has a big effect on convenience, 6 characters were lot less convenient 
than 4 characters in SMS and email, really stretching the work memory.
In emails the OTP code complexity doesn’t really matter, I’ll just copy-paste it anyways
McAffee-brand brings some credibility to Pledge client, but not that much
If I would not care about security, I would choose email because of the convenience. However, 
I would really chose SMS because it was convenient enough and feels really secure
I wouldn’t want to get any more emails than I already do.
Participant 5 (26 years old, female, UX & Concept Designer)
SMS felt really convenient and easy, enjoyable to use 
The SMS and email passcodes are visible on her iPhone without opening the screen lock -> 
feels like she’s got less control about them. Plus a potential security threat.
I lose my phone quite often so security would really worry me
Pledge needs more effort but still feels more convenient than the other methods. The few extra 
clicks are really easy to learn and repeat with muscle memory without any thinking after that.
“I had fun with email, but didn’t feel secure”
83
In my opinion, convenience needs both easiness (usability) and security
Pledge is the only one that gives me the full control, I can choose exactly when to generate the 
code
Pledge felt quick even though it had more clicks, the software design like rolling numbers in 
the code generation helped that
Pledge: “No typing, just tapping” - easy to control
It would feel more secure to visually delete the code after use and not to use the system back-
button
McAffee-brand brought more feeling of security to the Pledge client.
Participant 6 (25 years old, male, Product Development)
Now when I realized what it was, I have actually been using the SMS-based strong authentica-
tion before
SMS feels more personal and trustworthy than email
Bank, personal information and internet shops would feel worth of two-factor authentication
Any of these methods feels a lot better than the paper password lists used with the Finnish 
banks
A big security company like McAffee or a familiar bank would bring a lot more credibility the 
solution
I wouldn’t trust Google, Facebook or some other company that doesn’t have its main focus on 
security
Using this solution with every login (to a virtual desktop) would feel like a burden, I would 
trust a long password to be secure enough
I would like to use a virtual desktop, and I would use the required strong authentication if there 
were no way to avoid using it
SMS feels the most usable solution and secure enough, but I would like to have email as a 
backup if e.g. my battery dies.
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Appendix C : Pre-questionnaire for the test 
participants
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Appendix D : Likert questionnaire for the test 
participants
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